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In multi-alternative choice, the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects demonstrate
that the value of an alternative is not independent of the other alternatives in the choice-
set. Rather, these effects suggest that a choice is reached through the comparison of alter-
natives. We investigated exactly how alternatives are compared against each other using
eye-movement data. The results indicate that a series of comparisons is made in each
choice, with a pair of alternatives compared on a single attribute dimension in each com-
parison. We conclude that psychological models of choice should be based on these single-
attribute pairwise comparisons.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
In the domain of choice between multiple alternatives,
the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects demon-
strate some puzzling behaviours. Together these effects
demonstrate that an individual does not choose by select-
ing the alternative with the highest value or utility. Instead,
an individual chooses as if the value or utility of an alterna-
tive is temporarily affected by the other alternatives in the
choice set they face. This is puzzling because how much an
individual enjoys the car she or he buys, for example,
should be independent of the cars he or she does not buy.
These context effects are often interpreted as indicating
that a choice is reached by comparing available alterna-
tives. This study investigated how alternatives are com-
pared, using eye movement data collected while people
make a series of three-alternative choices.To illustrate the attraction, compromise, and similarity
effects, suppose an individual is choosing among different
cars. Available cars are described in terms of the two attri-
butes, quality and economy, where Car A is better on the
quality dimension but Car B is better on the economy
dimension (Fig. 1). The attraction effect is produced by
adding Car D to the choice of Cars A and B. Car D is inferior
to Car A in both quality and economy dimensions and
should thus be discarded but, after adding this decoy, Car
A becomes more likely chosen and Car B becomes less
likely chosen (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982). Adding Car C
to a choice between Cars A and B produces the compromise
effect. Car C has extremely good quality but poor economy.
Importantly, Car C makes Car A a compromise between the
other cars, and with Car C’s presence, Car A becomes more
likely to be chosen than Car B (Simonson, 1989). The
similarity effect is produced by adding Car S instead. Car
S is similar to Car B, and Car S’s introduction results in
the higher probability of Car A being chosen than Car B
(Tversky, 1972).
Fig. 1. Illustration of various alternatives. The probability of A being
chosen over B can be affected by the presence of D, C or S.
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described above, an individual has to be comparing alter-
natives in making a choice (e.g., Simonson, Bettman,
Kramer, & Payne, 2013). Here we explore the nature of
these comparisons, and consider models involving attri-
bute-wise comparison, alternative-wise comparison, and
attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison (see Table 1
for a list of the models).
According to attribute-wise comparison models, one
attribute dimension is attended at one moment and all
the available alternatives are simultaneously evaluated.
In the above car example, an individual may attend, for
instance, on the quality dimension of available cars at
one moment, and evaluate how advantageous each of the
three cars is. Then at the next moment, the individual
may attend the economy dimension and evaluate all three
cars. This attribute-wise comparison is implemented in
multi-alternative decision ﬁeld theory (Roe, Busemeyer, &
Townsend, 2001) and the leaky competing accumulator
model (Usher & McClelland, 2001) to explain the three
context effects.
In contrast, alternative-wise comparison models
assume that all the attributes are integrated before com-
parison: one pair of alternatives is attended, attribute
dimensions are integrated within each alternative, and
then the pair of alternatives are compared on their inte-
grated values. In the above example, an individual may
integrate the quality and economy dimensions for, for
instance, Car A, and also integrate these dimensions, sepa-
rately, for Car B. Then, the individual compares the inte-
grated value for Car A with Car B. At the next moment,
the individual may select a new pair of alternatives, Cars
A and S, and repeat the integrate-then-compare process.
This integration of information across attributes is com-
monly assumed in models of two-alternative choice,
including models where risk and reward information are
integrated into a single expected-value-like measure such
as cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman,
1992) and the transfer of attention exchange model
(Birnbaum, 2008). In the domain of multi-alternative
choice, the comparison-grouping model (Tsuzuki & Guo,
2004) implements a mixture of attribute-wise and alterna-
tive-wise comparisons to explain the context effects.
Lastly in the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison,
one attribute dimension and also one pair of alternatives
are attended at one moment, and two alternatives are com-
pared against each other on the attended attribute dimen-
sion. For instance, an individual may attend on the qualityTable 1
A list of models discussed.
Comparison Model
Attribute-wise Multi-alternative decision ﬁeld theory
Leaky competing accumulator model
Alternative-wise Comparison-grouping model
Attribute-and-
alternative-wise
Decision by sampling
2N-ary choice tree model
Multi-attribute linear ballistic
accumulator modeldimension and compare Cars A and B at one moment. Then,
at the next moment, the individual may focus on the econ-
omy dimension and compare Cars A andD. This comparison
is assumed in the decision by sampling model (Stewart,
Chater, & Brown, 2006), which has been applied to context
effects in risky and intertemporal choice (Stewart, Reimers,
& Harris, in press) and could potentially be extended to
account for the three context effects. The attribute-and-
alternative-wise comparison has also been employed in
the 2N-ary choice tree model (Wollschläger & Diederich,
2012), and the multi-attribute linear ballistic accumulator
model (Trueblood, Brown, & Heathcote, in press).
This study examined predictions made by the three
types of comparison model. In particular, we tested predic-
tions concerning transitions of attention during choice and
effect of random ﬂuctuations in the attention on choice.
1.1. The pattern of attention transition
In attribute-wise comparison, all of the available alter-
natives are simultaneously compared on a single attribute
dimension. Therefore, an individual is likely to ﬁx attention
to one attribute dimension and shift their attention back
and forth between alternatives to make comparisons. Thus
we should see transitions of attention between alternatives
within a single attribute dimension more frequently than,
or at least equally frequently to, transitions within a single
alternative between attribute dimensions. This same pat-
tern of transitions is predicted by the attribute-and-alter-
native-wise comparison.
In contrast in the alternative-wise comparison models,
all the attributes are used simultaneously in each compar-
ison. Therefore, an individual is likely to ﬁx attention to
one alternative, shift their attention within the alternative
to integrate attribute values, and then make a comparison.
Thus we should see transitions of attention between attri-
butes within a single alternative more frequently than, or
at least equally frequently to, between alternatives.
1.2. The inﬂuence of stochastic ﬂuctuations in attention on
choice
When attribute dimensions are weighted equally so
that each attribute dimension is equally likely to be
attended at any moment, there will still be trial-to-trial
46 T. Noguchi, N. Stewart / Cognition 132 (2014) 44–56variations in the number of times each attribute dimension
is attended. This is due to the stochastic nature of the allo-
cation of attention, and the relative frequencies of the
observed split in attention are given by the binomial distri-
bution. For example, with two equally weighted dimen-
sions and with 10 allocations, the number of times each
dimension is attended would follow the binomial distribu-
tion. So we would see a 5/5 split 24.6% of the time but, just
by random chance, we would see the unequal splits (0/10,
1/9, 2/8, 3/7, or 4/6) 75.4% of the time.
Thus, for a particular trial, one attribute dimension will
often be attended more frequently than another, even
when attribute dimensions are weighted equally. These
trial-by-trial ﬂuctuations will increase the probability of
selecting the alternatives high on the more attended
dimension. To illustrate this prediction, we simulated the
multi-alternative decision ﬁeld theory. In this simulation,
a choice is reached after 1,000 comparisons and dimen-
sions are weighted equally. We explored how the choice
probabilities change with the number of times the quality
dimension is attended. The results are summarised in the
left panel in Fig. 2 (see Appendix A for the details). This ﬁg-
ure illustrates that, for example, when 490 comparisons
are made on the economy dimension and 510 comparisons
are on the quality dimension, probability of choosing Car A
is .69 with the presence of Car D in the choice set. Gener-
ally when Car D or S is included in a choice set, more sam-
pling of the quality dimension predicts higher probability
of Car A to be chosen.
We also considered attention ﬂuctuating over pairs of
alternatives in the alternative-wise comparison models.
One pair of alternatives will more frequently be compared
against each other even with an equal weighting of all the
pairs. This stochastic bias towards one pair of alternatives
results in these alternatives being more likely to be chosen.
For example if an individual more frequently compares
Cars B and C, the individual is more likely to choose Car
B or C and less likely to choose Car A. To illustrate this pre-
diction, we simulated a modiﬁed version of the comparison
grouping model. This modiﬁed version assumes that all the
pairs of alternatives are equally weighted and that an alter-(a) Attribute-wise Comparison: 
A Decision Field Theory Simulation 
Fig. 2. Simulated choice probability. The darkness of the line corresponds to t
vertical dotted line represents most likely attention split.native is chosen after 1,000 alternative-wise comparisons
(see Appendix B for the details). We manipulated the num-
ber of comparisons made between Cars B and D, C, or S, and
summarised the results in the right panel of Fig. 2. The ﬁg-
ure shows that the probability of choosing Car A decreases
with the frequency of comparisons between Cars B and D,
C, or S.
Finally, in the attribute-and-alternative-wise compari-
son models, bias towards one pair of alternatives affects
choice. But here, attention to an alternative pair interacts
with attention towards an attribute dimension: In the car
example, an individual is more likely to choose Car A over
B if the individual more frequently compares Cars A and B
on the economy dimension. In contrast, frequent compari-
son of Cars A and B on the quality dimension should lead to
the choice of Car B.
In summary, the three types of model predict different
patterns of attention transition and make competing
claims on how a stochastic attention bias explains choice.
These claims were examined using eye-movement data
in the following experiment.2. Method
Following Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2012)’s
recommendation, we report how we determined our sam-
ple size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and
all measures in the study.2.1. Participants
One hundred undergraduate students were recruited
through the participant panel at the University of Warwick
and were paid £5.00 for participating. We decided in
advance of collecting the data to test exactly 100
participants. Our previous work indicated that this would
give us reasonable statistical power to replicate the attrac-
tion, compromise, and similarity effects. Seven participants
could not complete the experiment due to failure in tracking
their eyes (e.g., lazy eyes), leaving 93 (34 males and 59(b) Alternative-wise Comparison: 
A Comparison Grouping Model 
Simulation
he likelihood of the attention frequency given the equal weighting, and
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(median = 21.0).2.2. Procedure
Participants made 40 choices. At the beginning of each
choice, participants were given information about the
two attributes involved. After displaying the ﬁxation point
until participant ﬁxated it for at least 500 ms, the experi-
ment program presented three choice alternatives: one at
the lower left corner of the screen, another at the top mid-
dle area, and the other at the lower right corner of the
screen. This presentation ensures that the three alterna-
tives are equally distant from each other on the display.
An example screen shot is given in Fig. 3. Participants made
a choice by pressing one of the left, up, or right arrow keys.
The 40 choices comprised 10 attraction, 10 compro-
mise, 10 similarity, and 10 catch choices. The catch choices
always had one dominant alternative on both attribute
dimensions. We used participants’ responses to the catch
choices to assess whether they were engaged in the task.
Each of the other 30 choices appeared in one of two ver-
sions, one favouring Alternative A and another favouring
B. The two versions are summarised in Fig. 4.
The left panel in Fig. 4 displays the alternatives for the
two versions of the attraction choices. One version
involved Alternatives A, B and DA (the decoy to Alternative
A), and the other involved Alternatives A, B, and DB (the
decoy to Alternative B). The middle panel displays the
alternatives for the compromise choices. One version
involved Alternatives A, B, and CA (making Alternative A
the compromise), and the other involved Alternatives A,
B, and CB (making Alternative B the compromise). The right
panel displays alternatives for the similarity choices: one
version involved Alternatives A, B, and SA (adding an alter-
native similar to Alternative B), and the other involved
Alternatives A, B, and SB (adding an alternative similar to
Alternative A). The allocation of versions was counterbal-
anced between participants.
Each of 40 choices involved a different cover story (e.g.,
cars, laptops, and TV sets), and the same cover story was
used for the two version of choices. Thus, all the partici-
pant made a choice between cars in an attraction choice,(a) Choice Description
Fig. 3. Example screen-shots. This example depicts a choice between carregardless of the version to which they were assigned.
The order of the choices was randomised and the four
types of choices were interleaved. The locations of alterna-
tives and attributes on the screen were randomised for
each choice.
Throughout the experiment, participants’ eye-move-
ments were recorded at 500 Hz using an EyeLink 1000
(SR Research). The eye-tracker was placed right under the
19 in. monitor, and the distance between participant’s
eye and the eye-tracker was kept between 50 cm and
55 cm. Also, the eye-tracker was calibrated just before
the experiment and also after every 10 choices during
the experiment.3. Results
Out of 93 participants, 44 participants did not choose
the dominant alternative in one or more of the catch
choices. These less-engaged participants may have been
unable to differentiate the attraction and similarity
choices, where the detection of dominance is crucial. Thus,
the analysis below includes engagement as a factor, noting
where it matters.
3.1. The attraction, compromise, and similarity effects were
replicated
We computed the proportion of times each alternative
was chosen for each choice type for each participant. The
choice proportions from the engaged group of participants
are plotted in Fig. 5. The ﬁlled circles with the solid line
represent the version of choices which favours Alternative
A, and the empty squares with the dashed line represent
the one which favours Alternative B.
The left panel in Fig. 5 shows a replication of the attrac-
tion effect: Alternative A is most often selected from the DA
version while Alternative B is most frequently chosen from
the DB version. The middle panel shows a replication of the
compromise effect: The compromise alternatives are most
often to be chosen in both CA and CB versions. The right
panel shows a replication of the similarity effect: Alterna-
tive A has a higher proportion of choice in the SA version
compared to the SB version and Alternative B has a higher(b) Choice Set
s in an attraction choice. Font size is enlarged for this illustration.
(a) Attraction Choices (b) Compromise Choices (c) Similarity Choices
Fig. 4. Locations of the alternatives used in the experiment.
(a) Attraction Choices (b) Compromise Choices (c) Similarity Choices 
Fig. 5. Mean choice proportions of the engaged participants. Error bars are standard error of the mean.
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to the SA version.
We explored the signiﬁcance of these effects using a
mixed-effect model. The proportions for Alternatives A
and B are logit-transformed after multiplying with 0.9 to
handle ones and adding 0.05 to handle zeros. Then the
transformed proportions are entered into a linear
mixed-effect linear model. The model had ﬁxed effects
for alternative (A or B), version (whether the version
favours Alternative A or B), choice-type (attraction, com-
promise, or similarity), and participant group (engaged or
less-engaged). The model also had by-participant slopes
and intercepts as random factors.
The model ﬁt indicates that the effect of the three-way
interaction depends on participant engagement: the four-
way interaction is signiﬁcant, v2(2) = 17.92, p < .001. When
the same model is ﬁt only to the engaged group of partic-
ipants, the three-way interaction effect indicates that the
effect of choice alternative on the choice proportion
depends on the choice type and the version: v2(2) =
28.84, p < .001. Thus, we ﬁt the same mixed-effect model
to the attraction, compromise and similarity choices sepa-
rately for the group of engaged participants.
For the attraction choices, the interaction effect is sig-
niﬁcant, v2(1) = 44.47, p < .001, indicating that the choice
proportions for Alternatives A and B are different between
the DA and DB versions. The interaction effects are also
signiﬁcant for the compromise choices, v2(1) = 19.90,p < .001, and for the similarity choices, v2(1) = 4.11,
p = .043. These interaction effects indicate that the attrac-
tion, compromise and, similarity effects are replicated in
this study.
For the group of the less-engaged participants, the
three-way interaction is also signiﬁcant: v2(2) = 51.81,
p < .001. The attraction and compromise effects are con-
ﬁrmed: v2(1) = 34.23, p < .001 and v2(1) = 27.37, p < .001.
However, the similarity effect does not reach signiﬁcance:
v2(1) = 0.11, p = .738.3.2. Eye movements
For the ﬁxation data, we deﬁned non-overlapping
regions of interest to identify towhich alternative and attri-
bute dimension the participant ﬁxated his or her eye on.
Due to noise in the detecting ﬁxation locations, ﬁxations
were not registered for some of the displayed attributes
in 153 out of the total of 2,790 (=30 choices  93 partici-
pants) trials. These trials are removed from the analysis.
Then, each choice was recoded to match the labels in
Fig. 1. So for the DA version of the attraction choices, DA
was relabelled D. For the DB version, DB was relabelled D
and labels for A and B were swapped. In addition, the attri-
bute dimensions were switched when relabelling the alter-
natives in the DB version. Similar relabelling was done for
the compromise and similarity choices.
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Previous studies which analyse eye-movement often
assume three stages of decision making: initial screening,
evaluation and comparison, and validation prior to making
a choice (e.g., Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Russo & Leclerc,
1994). Glöckner and Herbold (2011) review evidence that
the duration of ﬁxations increases with processing difﬁ-
culty, and so differences in ﬁxation duration over time
may indicate different processing stages.
To examine the stages of decision making, we seg-
mented the sequence of ﬁxations into three blocks. Each
block has the equal number of ﬁxations, but when the
number of ﬁxations is not dividable by three, we added
the reminder to the last block. Then the mean ﬁxation
duration is computed for each block for each participant
and displayed in Fig. 6. This ﬁgure illustrates that the ﬁxa-
tion tends to be longer in the ﬁrst block.
The ﬁxation durations were examined with a mixed-
effect model. Fixed effects are ﬁxated alternative (A, B, or
the third alternative), ﬁxated attribute dimension, block
(1, 2, or 3), and choice-type (attraction, compromise, or
similarity). Random effects are by-participant intercept
and slope for block. The interaction effects indicates that
the ﬁxation duration does not differ between the alterna-
tives or the attribute dimensions (ps > .066), but that the
difference between blocks depends on the choice-type
(v2(4) = 13.48, p = .009). Thus, we ﬁt the mixed-effect
model separately for each choice-type. Although the
strength of the effect may differ between the choice-
types, the effect of block is signiﬁcant for all the
three choice-types (v2(2) = 49.34, p < .001 for the attrac-
tion choices; v2(2) = 44.92, p < .001 for the compromise
choices; v2(2) = 37.37, p < .001 for the similarity choices),
indicating that the ﬁxation duration is signiﬁcantly longer
in the ﬁrst block.
The longer ﬁxation in the ﬁrst block may indicate a
qualitatively different stage of decision making. Therefore,
we examined effects of the block in the following analysis,
although the results hold if the block is not included in the
analysis.
3.4. The pattern of attention transitions
According to the attribute-wise and attribute-
and-alternative-wise comparison models, transitions of(a) Attraction Choices (b) Compro
Fig. 6. Fixation duration as a function of time. Eattention between alternatives on a single attribute should
be more frequent than, or at least equally frequent to, tran-
sitions between attributes within a single alternative. In
contrast, according to the alternative-wise comparison
models, transitions of attention within a single alternative
should be more frequent than, or at least equally frequent
to, transitions between alternatives.
The difference between the number of transitions
between alternatives and within an alternative is displayed
in Fig. 7. The between-alternatives transitions include only
those on a single attribute dimension, excluding the
between-alternatives, between-attributes transitions.
Thus, the between-alternative transitions are underesti-
mated, which should favour the prediction from the alter-
native-wise comparison. However, between-alternatives
transitions are more frequently observed than within-
alternative transitions, consistent with the attribute-wise
and attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison models.
These transitions are examined with a mixed-effect
model, whose ﬁxed effects are participant group (engaged
or less-engaged), choice-type (attraction, compromise, or
similarity), and block (1, 2, or 3), and the random effects
are by-participant slopes and intercepts. The three-way
and two-way interaction effects indicate that the effect of
transition-type does not differ signiﬁcantly between the
participant groups or the blocks: ps > .064. The main effect
of choice-type is signiﬁcant: v2(1) = 6.87, p = .032. When
the mixed-effect model was ﬁt to each choice-type, the
estimated intercept indicates the scores are signiﬁcantly
different from zero: b = 0.48 (95% CI [0.29, 0.68]) for the
attraction choices; b = 0.33 (95% CI [0.12, 0.53]) for the com-
promise choices; b = 0.52 (95% CI [0.31, 0.73]) for the simi-
larity choices. These results suggest that the effect differs
quantitatively but not qualitatively across the choice-types.
Thus, the attention transitionsmore frequently between
alternatives on the same attribute dimension than within
an alternative. This pattern of attention transition supports
the attribute-wise and attribute-and-alternative-wise
comparison models and rejects the alternative-wise
comparison models.
3.5. The inﬂuence of stochastic ﬂuctuations in attention on
choice
Before examining the inﬂuence of attention bias on
choice – the subject of the simulations above – we needmise Choices (c) Similarity Choices
rror bars are standard error of the mean.
Fig. 7. Difference in transitions. Error bar are standard error of the mean.
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Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). In the gaze cascade effect a
developing preference for an alternative causes more fre-
quent eye-movements to that alternative and vice versa,
in a positive feedback loop. This gaze-cascade effect is con-
sidered independent of the comparison process and could
artiﬁcially favour one prediction over another. Thus, we
quantiﬁed the gaze-cascade effect and used it as a control
variable.
Speciﬁcally, we counted the number of transitions
towards an alternative and the number away from the
alternative. According to Bird, Lauwereyns, and Crawford
(2012), transitions towards an alternative increase the
probability of selecting that alternative, and transitions
away from an alternative decrease the probability of
selecting that alternative. Importantly, once the number
of transitions towards and away from an alternative is con-
trolled for, there is no overall effect of the total number of
ﬁxations in predicting a choice.
As the number of transitions towards an alternative is
highly correlatedwith the number of transitions away from
the alternative, we took the difference as the gaze-cascade
score. By deﬁnition, the number of transitions towards an
alternative must be one less than, equal to, or one more
than the number of transitions away from that alternative,
and so the gaze-cascade score for an alternative was always
1, 0, or +1. When tested alone in a mixed-effect logistic
regression with by-participant intercept and slope as ran-
dom factors, the gaze-cascade score for Alternative A signif-
icantly predicts the choice of Alternative A: b = 0.52 (95% CI
[0.45, 0.59]), v2(1) = 144.27, p < .001. The gaze-cascade
score for each alternative was entered as both ﬁxed and
by-participant random factors to all the models to predict
choices we used below.
Attribute-wise comparison. In the attribute-wise com-
parison models, a stochastic bias in attention towards one
attribute dimension over the other should predict a choice
of the alternative on which that attribute is highest, as in
the simulation described above. To examine this predic-
tion, we counted differences in the numbers of ﬁxations
and also summed the duration of ﬁxations between the
attribute dimensions within each trial. We ﬁrst examined
whether ﬁxation counts and durations varied over the time
course of a trial before testing whether ﬁxation counts and
durations were related to choices as the attribute-wise
comparison models predict.To examine whether these ﬁxation counts and duration
differ between the blocks, we used a mixed-effect model.
Fixed factors are block (1, 2, or 3), participant group
(engaged or less-engaged), and choice-type (attraction,
compromise, or similarity), and random factors are by-
participant slopes and intercepts. While we tested the
counts and durations in the separate models, the total
ﬁxation duration is correlated with the ﬁxation counts, as
the average duration of each ﬁxation does not differ signif-
icantly between alternatives or attributes (see the analysis
in Section ‘‘Stages of decision making’’). As a result, the
model with ﬁxation duration yielded essentially the same
results as the model with the ﬁxation counts. The model
ﬁts suggest that the counts and the duration do not dif-
fer signiﬁcantly between blocks, participant groups or
choice-types (ps > .066). Thus, we summed the counts
and durations across the blocks to explore their relation-
ship to choice.
The ﬁxation counts and durations were then entered
into mixed-effect logistic regressions to predict the choice
of Alternative A. The ﬁxed effects include participant group
(engaged or less-engaged) and choice type (attraction,
compromise, or similarity), and the random effects are
by-participant slopes and intercepts. The three-way and
two-way interaction effects indicate that the effect of
attention bias over attribute dimensions, in both counts
and durations, does not depend on the participant group
or the choice-type: ps > .682. The main effect suggests that
attention bias is not a signiﬁcant predictor of choice:
b = 0.00 (95% CI [0.01, 0.02]), v2(1) = 0.05, p = .821 for
the counts and b = 0.00 (95% CI [0.00, 0.00]),
v2(1) = 2.02, p = .155 for the duration. Thus, the prediction
from the attribute-wise comparison models is not
supported.
Alternative-wise comparison. In the alternative-wise
comparison models, a bias in attention towards one pair
of alternatives negatively correlates with probability of
the remaining alternative being chosen, as in the simula-
tion described above. To examine this prediction, we
counted the number of transitions between each pair of
alternatives within each trial. First we describe how, over
the time course of a trial, some transitions come to be more
frequent than others. Then we test whether the transition
frequencies on a trial can be used to predict the choice on
that trial in the way alternative-wise comparison models
predict.
The transitions are displayed in Fig. 8 which shows that
the differences between the transitions emerge over a trial.
Transitions were transformed by adding 1 and logging
before being entered into a mixed-effect linear regression
in which the effects of block were examined. Fixed factors
are block (1, 2, or 3), participant group (engaged or less-
engaged), choice-type (attraction, compromise, or similar-
ity), and transition (between A and B, between B and the
third alternative, or between A and the third alternative),
and the random factor was by-participant intercepts.
Random factors do not include by-participant slopes, to
keep the model complexity manageable. The four-way
and three-way interaction effects indicate that the interac-
tion effects do not depend on participant group (ps > .308),
but that block has different effect depending on choice-type
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effect model is ﬁt to each choice-type separately.
The model ﬁts suggest that the effect of block depends
on transition for all the choice-types (the attraction
choices: v2(4) = 135.90, p < .001; the compromise choices:
v2(4) = 101.16, p < .001; the similarity choices: v2(4) =
170.04, p < .001). When the mixed-effect models were ﬁt
separately to each block, the model ﬁts indicate that in
the attraction and compromise choices, the transitions dif-
fer from each other non-signiﬁcantly in Block 1 (ps > .147),
but signiﬁcantly in Blocks 2 and 3 (the attraction choices:
v2(2) = 48.04, p < .001 and v2(2) = 111.68, p < .001, respec-
tively; the compromise choices: v2(2) = 35.60, p < .001
and v2(2) = 87.38, p < .001) In the similarity choices, the
transitions differ in all the blocks (Block 1: v2(2) = 9.08,
p = .011; Block 2: v2(2) = 65.98, p < .001; Block 3:
v2(2) = 100.71, p < .001).
Although the signiﬁcance of the differences in the tran-
sitions differs between blocks, the direction of the differ-
ences is consistent across the blocks. In short, we see
that, as the choice unfolds, differences in the frequencies
of each transition type emerge. Before the attribute values
have been read, there can be no bias to make some transi-
tions more frequently than others. So gradually emerging
differences in the transitions are entirely expected. The
consistent directions of the differences imply that the pro-
cess of decision making is not qualitatively different
between the blocks.
The second state of our analysis is to see whether tran-
sition frequencies can be used to predict choices as the
alternative-wise comparison models predict. We summed
the transitions across the blocks and displayed the
summed transitions in Fig. 9. The transitions are largely
consistent with the predictions for the alternative-wise
comparison models for all three choice types. For example,
the transition between Alternatives A and B is more fre-
quent before A or B is chosen, and also the transition
between Alternatives A and the third alternative is more
frequent before A or the third alternative is chosen.
These transitions were entered into a mixed-effect
logistic regression to predict the choice of Alternative A.(a) Attraction Choices (b) Compro
Fig. 8. Number of transitions prior to making a choiThe ﬁxed effects include participant group and choice type,
and the random effects are by-participant slopes and inter-
cept. The interaction effects indicate that the effect of tran-
sitions does not signiﬁcantly depend on the participant
group (ps > .567), but that the effect depends on the
choice-type: v2(2) = 82.53, p < .001.
Consistent with the prediction, the transition between
Alternatives B and D is a signiﬁcant, negative predictor of
choice A in the attraction choices: b = 0.18 (95% CI
[0.27, 0.09]), v2(1) = 16.11, p < .001. Also the transition
between B and S is a signiﬁcant negative predictor in the
similarity choices: b = 0.39 (95% CI [0.48, 0.31]),
v2(1) = 92.13, p < .001. However, the effect of the transition
between B and C is not signiﬁcant in the compromise
choices: b = 0.02 (95% CI [0.10, 0.06]), v2(1) = 0.24,
p = .626.
In addition, some of the transitions, which involve
Alternative A, signiﬁcantly predict the choice of A. In the
attraction choices, the transition between Alternatives A
and D predicts the choice of A: b = 0.27 (95% CI [0.19,
0.35]), v2(1) = 49.37, p < .001. This effect further implicates
the alternative-wise comparison in the attraction choices,
as the comparison between A and D always favours A.
Also in the compromise choices, the transition between
Alternatives A and B and also between A and C predict the
choice of A: b = 0.09 (95% CI [0.02, 0.25]), v2(1) = 6.63,
p = .010; and b = 0.13 (95% CI [0.06, 0.20]), v2(1) = 12.11,
p < .001. In the similarity choices, the transition between
Alternatives A and S predicts the choice of A: b = 0.12
(95% CI [0.04, 0.20]), v2(1) = 7.78, p = .005 .
The other signiﬁcant predictor is not readily explained
by the alternative-wise comparison. In the attraction
choice, the transition between A and B negatively predict
the choice of A: b = 0.08 (95% CI [0.15, 0.01]),
v2(1) = 4.69, p = .030.
Thus, the effects of the transitions on choice are gener-
ally consistent with the predictions from the alternative-
wise comparison, though some additional effects are not
readily explained.
Attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison. Accord-
ing to the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison, anmise Choices (c) Similarity Choices
ce. Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
(a) Attraction Choices (b) Compromise Choices (c) Similarity Choices
Fig. 9. Number of transitions prior to making a choice. Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
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choice of the alternative better on the attended attribute
dimension, as described above. As the transitions are cor-
related between the attribute dimensions, we summed
the numbers of ﬁxation transitions favourable for each
alternative, so that the larger count indicates more com-
parisons favourable to an alternative. For example, in an
attraction choice, the transitions favourable for Alternative
A is the sum of the transitions between Alternative A and B
on the quality dimension and between A and D on both
quality and economy dimensions. Our analysis here fol-
lows the same procedure as the analysis for attribute-wise
comparisons and for alternative-wise comparisons above:
First we explore how the counts of favourable transitions
unfold over the time course of a trial and then we explore
whether these counts predict choice as the attribute-
and-alternative-wise comparison models predict.
The favourable transitions are summarised in Fig. 10. In
the attraction choices, the transitions favourable to Alter-
native A increase with block, because the transition
between Alternatives A and D, which favours A, becomes
more frequent with block (see Fig. 8). Likewise in the com-
promise choices, as the transition between Alternatives A
and B and between Alternatives A and C becomes more fre-
quent, the transitions favourable to A increase. Also in the
similarity choices, as the transition between Alternatives B
and S becomes more frequent, the transitions favourable to
B and S increase.
These transitions are transformed by adding 1 and log-
ging, and then entered into a mixed-effect linear regres-
sion. Fixed effects are block (1, 2, or 3), participant group
(engaged or less-engaged), choice-type (attraction, com-
promise, or similarity), and favoured alternative (A, B, or
the third alternative). By-subject intercepts but not slopes
are included in the random effects. The interaction and
main effects indicate that the transitions do not differ sig-
niﬁcantly between participant groups (ps > .430), but that
the effect of block differs between the choice-types and
alternatives (v2(8) = 167.29, p < .001). Thus, we ﬁt the
mixed-effect model to each choice-type separately.In all three choice-types, the interaction and main
effects indicate that the count does not differ between
the participant groups (ps > .097), but that the effect of
favoured alternative depends on the block (the attraction
choices: v2(4) = 107.95, p < .001; the compromise choices:
v2(4) = 37.30, p < .001; the similarity choices: v2(4) =
55.36, p < .001).
Again, although the signiﬁcance of the difference differs
between the blocks, the directions of the differences are
consistent across the blocks. Thus, we summed the transi-
tions across the blocks and displayed the transitions as a
function of the chosen alternative in Fig. 11.
Consistent with the prediction from the attribute-and-
alternative wise comparison, the transition is generally
higher for the alternative to be chosen. Before Alternative
A is chosen (the empty circles), for example, the transition
favouring A (the left column in each plot) is higher than the
other transitions across the three choice-types.
These transitions were then entered into a mixed-effect
logistic regression to predict the choice of Alternative A.
The ﬁxed effects include participant group and choice-
type, and the random effects are by-participant slopes
and intercept. The interaction effects indicate that the
effect of transitions does not depend on the participant
group (ps > .28), and that the effect depends on the
choice-type: v2(6) = 39.25, p < .001.
Consistent with the prediction, the transition, which
indicates more frequent comparison favourable to Alterna-
tive A, is a signiﬁcant predictor of choice A in the attrac-
tion, compromise, similarity choices: respectively, b =
0.17 (95% CI [0.11, 0.24]), v2(1) = 26.76, p < .001; b = 0.17
(95% CI [0.07, 0.26]), v2(1) = 11.77, p < .001; and b = 0.24
(95% CI [0.14, 0.34]), v2(1) = 20.69, p < .001.
In addition, the transition, which indicates more fre-
quent comparison favourable to other alternatives than
A, is a signiﬁcant, negative predictor of choice A in the
attraction and similarity choices. In the attraction choices,
the transition favourable to Alternative B shows b = 0.19
(95% CI [0.29, 0.10]), v2(1) = 15.89, p < .001. In the sim-
ilarity choices, the transition favourable to Alternative B
(a) Attraction Choices (b) Compromise Choices (c) Similarity Choices
Fig. 10. Number of transitions prior to making a choice. Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
(a) Attraction Choices (b) Compromise Choices (c) Similarity Choices
Fig. 11. Number of transitions prior to making a choice. Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
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25.18, p < .001; and that favourable to S shows b = 0.17
(95% CI [0.27, 0.08]), v2(1) = 12.51, p < .001.
Thus, the results consistently support the prediction
from the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison.4. Discussion
The present study replicated the attraction, compromise,
and similarity effects in a within-participants design using
40 different consumer choice scenarios. This is the sec-
ond study, following Berkowitsch, Scheibehenne, and
Rieskamp (in press), to simultaneously replicate the three
effects in consumer choice. This is also the ﬁrst study to
recordeyemovements inparticipants showingtheseeffects.
This study investigated the psychological processes of
multi-alternative choice, focusing on how alternatives are
compared against each other. We examined transitions of
attention while a choice was being made. Speciﬁcally, thepattern of eye movements was examined to differentiate
between three types of comparison model: attribute-wise,
alternative-wise, and attribute-and-alternative-wise.
Transitions between alternatives within an attribute
dimension were more frequent that transitions within
alternatives between attributes, consistent with attribute-
wise and attribute-and-alternative-wise models. The attri-
bute-wise comparison models predict that bias towards a
dimension should increase the probability that the alterna-
tive highest on that dimension should be chosen, but there
was no signiﬁcant effect of attribute-dimension bias. The
alternative-wise comparison models predict that bias
towards a pair of alternatives should decrease the probabil-
ity that the third alternative is chosen, and this effect of
alternative-pair bias was found. Finally, the attribute-
and-alternative-wise comparison models alone predict an
interaction between the alternative-pair and the attribute
dimension attended. For a given pair and dimension, the
alternative higher on the attribute dimension attended
should be favoured over the alternative lower on the
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observed. Overall, the eye movement data are most consis-
tent with the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison
models, in which comparisons are between pairs of alterna-
tives on single dimensions.
The ﬁnding of more transitions between alternatives
within an attribute dimension could be inﬂuenced by
physical locations of the alternatives within the display.
In our experiment, the distance between the alternatives
is deliberately very similar to the distance between two
attribute values within an alternative. However, if
between-alternative distances were minimised compared
to within-alternative distances, attention might transition
more frequently between alternatives, appearing as if the
alternative-wise comparison is supported. Previous
research however, has also favoured the attribute-wise
comparison over the alternative-wise comparison: When
an individual is allowed to choose which information to
examine, the individual more often decides to reveal
information on one attribute dimension across available
alternatives (Payne, 1976). Also, our results conform previ-
ous ﬁndings, where transition is more frequent between
alternatives on a single attribute dimension than within
an alternative (Russo & Dosher, 1983).
While attribute-wise comparison models are supported
by the attention-transition evidence, these models are not
consistent with the null effect of attention bias on choice.
This result has implications for computational models
beyond the class of comparison-based models described
above. For instance, the associative accumulation model
(Bhatia, 2013) explains the context effects with attention
bias towards one attribute dimension over the other. Also,
the range-normalisation model (Soltani, De Martino, &
Camerer, 2012) predicts that the attention bias should lead
to different choices. These explanations are not consistent
with the present results.
These relationships between transition and choices
extend previous ﬁndings on eye-movement and choice.
Krajbich and Rangel (2011) for instance, proposed a
drift–diffusion model which incorporated ﬁxations, by
assuming that the drift rate was higher for ﬁxated alterna-
tives. This model relates a priori ratings of the attractive-
ness of alternatives and the ﬁxation times on each
alternative during a choice to the ﬁnal choice of alterna-
tive. That is, to predict choice this model requires the pat-
tern of ﬁxations and also attractiveness judgements for
each alternative. In contrast, our study focused on predict-
ing choices from the pattern of attention transitions alone.
A second major ﬁnding is the gaze cascade effect
(Shimojo et al., 2003; Simion & Shimojo, 2007). The gaze
cascade effect is a developing bias to direct an eye-ﬁxation
toward the alternative ultimately chosen. As a result,
choice can be predicted from transitions (Bird et al.,
2012). While it is not clear how well this gaze cascade
effect correlates with preference development (e.g.,
Glaholt & Reingold, 2009, 2011), our results conﬁrm the
positive relationship between the gaze cascade (measured
from transitions) and choice. Also, the results show that
even after controlling for this gaze cascade effect, the pat-
tern of transition still predicts choices and reveals details
of the comparison process in choice making.In our analysis we were careful to explore how eye
movements changed over the time course of a choice,
because changes might indicate different stages of process-
ing (e.g., Glöckner & Herbold, 2011). Although we did ﬁnd a
surprising tendency for early ﬁxations to be longer, we did
not ﬁnd any qualitative shift in the pattern of eye move-
ments. Instead, each of the biases we ﬁnd emerged gradu-
ally within a trial. This is not surprising because, given that
the biases are deﬁned only by the relation of the attribute
values to one another and not by some more obvious cue
like physical location on the screen, these biases cannot
emerge until the attribute values have been read and
compared. Our data are most consistent with a single con-
tinuous cognitive process operating over the whole time
course of a choice, unless of course each cognitive process
produces the same pattern of eye movements. For
example, an individual may make comparisons to make a
choice and then make comparisons to justify the choice
before declaring the choice (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Thus
some or maybe all eye movements may be the result of a
post-choice justiﬁcation process, though we think it unli-
kely that none of the eye movements reﬂects the choice
process. If so, the choosing and post-choice justiﬁcation
both rely upon a series of comparisons of pairs of alterna-
tives on a single dimension.
The effects of attention bias on a choice are consistent
with the attribute-and-alternative-wise comparison mod-
els. Here a choice is reached through a series of compari-
sons of pairs of attributes on a single dimension, as in
the decision by sampling model (Stewart, 2009; Stewart
et al., 2006, in press; Stewart & Simpson, 2008), the 2N-
ary choice tree model (Wollschläger & Diederich, 2012),
and the multi-attribute linear ballistic accumulator model
(Trueblood et al., in press).Acknowledgements
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In this appendix, we describe the computation to derive
the results in the left panel in Fig. 2. The parameter values
and the alternative values are taken from Hotaling,
Busemeyer, and Li (2010).
In simulating multi-alternative decision ﬁeld theory, we
label three alternatives as A, B, and T, where T indicates D, C
or S depending on the choice set. These alternatives are
described with two attributes, E (economy) and Q (quality).
The value of Alternative A on the economy dimension is
denoted as EA and that on the quality dimension is QA.
The values used in the simulation is summarised in
Table A1. Preference for the three alternatives is organised
in a column vector, P. The ﬁrst element in this vector cor-
responds to preference for Alternative A, the second corre-
sponds to preference for B, and the third corresponds to
T. Noguchi, N. Stewart / Cognition 132 (2014) 44–56 55preference for T. This preference is iteratively updated as
follows:
Pðt þ 1Þ ¼ SPðtÞ þ Vðt þ 1Þ;
where S is a 3  3 feedback matrix and V is a 3  1 momen-
tary valence vector. In the feedback matrix, the inﬂuence of
Alternative i on j, sij, is computed as:
sij ¼ 0:99ðdij  0:05expð0:022D2ijÞÞ:
Here, dij is 1 if i equals j, otherwise dij is 0. Also, Dij is a
distance between Alternatives i and j, which is deﬁned as:
Dij ¼
ðDQij  DEijÞ2
2
þ 12 ðDQij þ DEijÞ
2
2
;
where
DQij ¼ Qi  Qj
and
DEij ¼ Ei  Ej:
The momentary valence vector is computed with four
matrices:
VðtÞ ¼ CMWðtÞ þ CðtÞ;
where
C ¼
1 12
1
2
1
2 1
1
2
1
2
1
2 1
2
64
3
75;
M ¼
EA QA
EB QB
ET QT
2
64
3
75;
and
ðtÞN ¼
0
0
0
2
64
3
75
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
2
64
3
75
0
B@
1
CA:
The attention weight W is a 2  1 vector. When the
economy dimension is attended,
WðtÞ ¼ 10
 
: ðA:1Þ
When the quality dimension is attended,
WðtÞ ¼ 01
 
: ðA:2Þ
The iterative update starts with zero preference for all
the alternatives, and after 1000 iterations, the alternative
with the highest preference is chosen. For each speciﬁedTable A1
Values used in the simulation.
Third alternative (T) EA EB ET QA QB QT
D 1.0 3.0 0.5 3.0 1.0 2.5
C 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.0
S 1.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 1.0 1.1frequency of (A.1) and (A.2), a choice is simulated 106
times to derive the probability of choosing each
alternative.Appendix B. Modiﬁed version of the comparison
grouping model
In this appendix, we describe the computation to derive
the results in the right panel in Fig. 2.
The three alternatives are labelled as A, B, and T, where
T indicates D, C or S depending on the choice set. These
alternatives are described with two attributes, E (econ-
omy) and Q (quality). The value of Alternative A on the
economy dimension is denoted as EA and that on the qual-
ity dimension is QA. The parameter values and the values
for the alternatives (Table B1) are taken from Tsuzuki
(2004). In the comparison grouping model, each alterna-
tive and each attribute dimension iteratively develops
preference. We denote preference for Alternative A as PA.
Then,
PAðt þ 1Þ ¼ PAðtÞ þ DAðt þ 1Þ: ðB:1Þ
If Alternative A is not attended at time t + 1, DA(t + 1) is
0, otherwise
DAðt þ 1Þ ¼
dAð1 PAðtÞÞ  0:04PAðtÞif dA > 0
dAPAðtÞ  0:04PAðtÞifdA 6 0

ðB:2Þ
where
dA ¼WEAPEðtÞ þWQAPQ ðtÞ  0:60ðPBðtÞ þ PTðtÞÞ; ðB:3Þ
and
WEA ¼
lnðEA þ 31Þ  3:35
0:905:
Preference for the other alternatives is updated in the
same manner.
In addition, preference for attribute dimensions is
updated at each iteration. Letting PE preference for the
economy dimension, PE is updated using Eqs. (B.2) and
(B.3), but instead of Eq. (B.3), we have
dE ¼WEAPAðtÞ þWEBPBðtÞ þWET PTðtÞ:
Preference for the quality dimension is updated in the
similar manner.
The iteration is initiated with preference for attribute
dimensions being 0.50 each, and preference for alterna-
tives starts with 0, rather than a random sample from the
uniform distribution between 0.25 and 0.75 as in the origi-
nal model. Also, unlike the original model, preference for
two attribute dimensions and only two alternatives is
updated at one iteration.Table B1
Values used in the simulation.
Third alternative (T) EA EB ET QA QB QT
D 2.0 8.0 1.5 8.0 2.0 7.5
C 5.0 8.0 2.0 5.0 2.0 8.0
S 2.0 8.0 7.5 8.0 2.0 2.5
56 T. Noguchi, N. Stewart / Cognition 132 (2014) 44–56After 1000 iterations, the alternative with the highest
preference is chosen. For simplicity, frequency of attending
a pair of Alternatives A and B is the same as attending a
pair of Alternatives A and T. For each frequency of attend-
ing a pair of Alternatives B and T, a choice is simulated 106
times to derive the choice probability.References
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